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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CHRIS ANN JAYE, 




OAK KNOLL VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; ERICK 
P. SPRONCK; ROBERT A. STEPHENSON; DENNIS LEFFLER; KELLY JONES; 
JENNIFER COOLING; KONSTANTINOS RENTOULIS; THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH 
COUSINS f/k/a JOSEPH COUSINS (deceased); MARILYN COUSINS; LES GIESE; 
ANNE THORNTON; MAINTENANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., its agents and assigns; 
CONDO MANAGEMENT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, its agents and assigns; 
RCP MANAGEMENT; ACCESS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, its agents and assigns; 
FOX CHASE CONTRACTING, LLC, its agents and assigns; TRACY BLAIR; 
BERMAN, SAUTER, RECORD & JACOBS, PC, its agents and assigns f/k/a BERMAN, 
SAUTER, RECORD & JACOBS; KENNETH SAUTER, ESQ. and CPA; EDWARD A. 
BERMAN, ESQ.; STEVEN ROWLAND, ESQ.; BROWN, MOSKOWITZ & KALLEN, 
PC., its agents and assigns; HILL WALLACK, its agents and assigns; MARSHALL, 
DENNEHY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN, its agents and assigns; SUBURBAN 
CONSULTING ENGINEERS, its agents and assigns; SCHNECK, PRICE, SMITH & 
KING, LLP, its agents and assigns; THE LAW OFFICES OF ANN M. MCGUFFIN, its 
agents and assigns; WILLIAMS TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE, its agents 
and assigns; CLINTON TOWNSHIP SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, its agents and 
assigns; PUMPING SERVICES, INC., its agents and assigns; J. FLETCHER-
CREAMER & SONS, its agents and assigns; STRATHMORE INSURANCE, its agents 
and assigns; QBE INSURANCE CORPORATION, its agents and assigns; 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION UNDERWRITERS OF AMERICA, INC., its agents 
and assigns; MIRRA & ASSOCIATES, LLC, its agents and assigns; JOHN DOES 1-20 
(Fictitious Names); STEPHENSON ASSOCIATES, INC.; HENKELS AND MCCOY, 
INC., its agents and assigns; FREY ENGINEERING; GNY INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, its agents and assigns 
____________________________________ 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-08324) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 19, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 In 2015, Chris Ann Jaye filed a complaint against numerous individuals and 
businesses, alleging that they violated her rights in connection with several state court 
cases.  Those state cases involve a dispute between Jaye and her condominium 
association regarding unpaid assessments and fees.    
 Various defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the doctrine of 
res judicata, that Jaye failed to state a claim for the federal causes of action, that the 
applicable statutes of limitations had expired, and that Jaye had signed a stipulation of 
dismissal in state court that precluded the federal suit.  By order entered November 30, 
2016, the District Court granted the moving defendants’ motions and dismissed all claims 
against all parties.  Jaye sought reconsideration, but the District Court denied relief.  Jaye 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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timely appealed, and we affirmed.  Jaye v. Oak Knoll Vill. Condo. Owners Ass’n, 751 F. 
App’x 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2018) (not precedential).   
 Meanwhile, Jaye filed in the District Court various post-judgment motions.  As 
relevant here, she moved to vacate an order that denied her motion reconsideration, her 
prior motions to vacate, and her motion for sanctions.  (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 367).  She also 
filed a motion to consolidate the case with other District Court actions.  (Dist. Ct. Doc. 
No. 384).  Finally, she moved to correct the record and vacate the District Court’s 
judgment of November 30, 2016.  (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 385).  The District Court denied 
those motions by order entered May 18, 2018.  (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 397).  Jaye filed a 
timely notice of appeal.1  (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 398).   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Isidor Paiewonsky 
Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1993) (post-judgment 
orders are final and immediately appealable), and review the denial of Jaye’s post-
judgment motions for abuse of discretion.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 
244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule 60(b) motions); Lehman Bros. Holdings v. Gateway 
Funding Diversified Mortg. Servs., L.P., 785 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2015) (motions to 
consolidate).  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  See Fairview Twp. v. 
EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).    
                                              
1 Although Jaye’s notice of appeal identified numerous orders entered by the District 
Court prior to her earlier appeal, the notice of appeal is timely as to only the order entered 
May 18, 2018.  
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 The District Court properly denied Jaye’s motions.  In her motion to vacate, (Dist. 
Ct. Doc. No. 367), Jaye alleged that the District Court improperly “transformed” three 
“valid, timely post-judgment motions[,]” (Dist. Ct. Doc. Nos. 312, 329, & 347), into 
untimely motions under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).  See Rule 7.1(i) (providing that, 
“[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or rule . . . , a motion for reconsideration shall be 
served and filed within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment . . . .”).  But even 
if the District Court had treated Jaye’s post-judgment motions as timely brought under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), as Jaye contends it should have, she would not 
have been entitled to relief.  A Rule 60(b) motion “may not be used as a substitute for an 
appeal, and . . . legal error, without more does not warrant relief under that provision.”  
United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).  In her post-judgment 
motions, Jaye simply alleged legal error in orders entered prior to the appeal that resulted 
in our decision affirming the dismissal of her complaint.  Because Jaye could have raised 
(and in some instances did raise) on appeal her arguments challenging the entry of the 
orders, relief was unavailable under Rule 60(b).  See Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 
562 F.2d 908, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1977).  Jaye’s motion to vacate also sought to challenge 
the District Court’s denial of her motion for sanctions.  The District Court’s denial of the 
motion for sanctions was proper, however.  In that motion, (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 330), Jaye 
repeated her allegation that some of the defendants had made false representations in 
their submissions to the District Court.  But a Magistrate Judge had earlier concluded that 
those allegations were meritless, (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 261), and Jaye’s motion for 
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sanctions offered no basis upon which to revisit that determination.  Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly denied Jaye’s motion to vacate. 
 Furthermore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
consolidation of Jaye’s District Court cases would be neither convenient nor economical 
“at this late date.”  Jaye filed a motion to consolidate the underlying action with three 
other cases that she had filed in the District of New Jersey.  Notably, however, when Jaye 
filed the consolidation motion on April 6, 2018, judgments already had been entered in 
all the cases.  Furthermore, in large part, those cases involved different parties.2  In 
addition, Jaye’s motion failed to explain what common questions of law or fact the cases 
shared.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).  Under these circumstances, we agree that judicial 
economy would not have been served by consolidating Jaye’s cases.   
  Finally, the District Court properly denied Jaye’s motion to correct the record and 
to vacate the District Court’s judgment of November 30, 2016.  The District Court denied 
relief because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the motion was not filed 
within “a reasonable time” of the submissions and orders that she sought to challenge.  
Even if the motion were timely, however, we conclude that it lacked merit.  With respect 
to the request to vacate, we have already affirmed the judgment entered by the District 
Court on November 30, 2016.  See Jaye, 751 F. App’x at 300.  In addition, Jaye failed to 
                                              
2 The underlying complaint named various individuals and businesses as defendants, and, 
while there was some overlap, the actions that Jaye sought to consolidate with that 
complaint were brought primarily against federal and state court judges, court staff, and 
the New Jersey Attorney General.  Jaye v. NJ Attorney Gen. John Hoffman, D.N.J. Civ. 
No. 1:14-cv-07471; Jaye v. Hoffman, D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:16-cv-07771; Jaye v. Fed. Judge 
Michael Shipp, D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:17-cv-05257.   
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adequately support her assertions that certain defendants misled the District Court, that 
the District Court Clerk failed to enter a default against some of the defendants, that the 
District Court failed to adjudicate all her prior motions, and that the Judge Shipp was 
biased and had “a known conflict.”   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3   
 
                                              
3 Jaye has filed in this Court numerous motions and letters, including requests for an 
injunction, to correct the record, and to suspend or disbar one of the appellees.  After 
careful consideration of those requests, they are denied.  We also deny the motions filed 
by appellees for summary action.  The appellees’ motions for sanctions and to preclude 
Jaye from filing further documents in the appeal are addressed in a separate order. 
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